Hauptmenü
  • Autor
    • Groß, Hannes
    • Mangard, Stefan
    • Korak, Thomas
  • TitelAn Efficient Side-Channel Protected AES Implementation with Arbitrary Protection Order
  • Volltext
  • Persistent Identifier
  • Erscheinungsjahr2017
  • LicenceCC-BY
  • ZugriffsrechteCC-BY
  • Konferenz NameRSA Conference Cryptographers’ Track 2017
  • Konferenz OrtSan Francisco
  • Konferenz StaatUnited States
  • Konferenz URLhttps://www.rambus.com/ct-rsa-2017/
  • Download Statistik112
  • Peer ReviewJa
  • AbstractPassive physical attacks, like power analysis, pose a serious threat to the security of digital circuits. In this work, we introduce an efficient side-channel protected Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) hardware design that is completely scalable in terms of protection order. Therefore, we revisit the private circuits scheme of Ishai et al. [13] which is known to be vulnerable to glitches. We demonstrate how to achieve resistance against multivariate higher-order attacks in the presence of glitches for the same randomness cost as the private circuits scheme. Although our AES design is scalable, it is smaller, faster, and less randomness demanding than other side-channel protected AES implementations. Our first-order secure AES design, for example, requires only 18 bits of randomness per S-box operation and 6 kGE of chip area. We demonstrate the flexibility of our AES implementation by synthesizing it up to the 15th protection order.