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  • Autor
    • Weiser, Samuel
    • Spreitzer, Raphael
    • Bodner, Lukas
  • TitelSingle Trace Attack Against RSA Key Generation in Intel SGX SSL
  • Datei
  • Persistent Identifier
  • Erscheinungsjahr2018
  • LicenceCC-BY
  • ZugriffsrechteCC-BY
  • Konferenz Name13th ACM ASIA Conference on Information, Computer and Communications Security
  • Konferenz OrtIncheon
  • Konferenz StaatSüdkorea
  • Konferenz URLhttp://asiaccs2018.org/
  • Download Statistik698
  • Peer ReviewJa
  • AbstractMicroarchitectural side-channel attacks have received significant attention recently. However, while side-channel analyses on secret key operations such as decryption and signature generation are well established, the process of key generation did not receive particular attention so far. Especially due to the fact that microarchitectural attacks usually require multiple observations (more than one mea- surement trace) to break an implementation, one-time operations such as key generation routines are often considered as uncritical and out of scope. However, this assumption is no longer valid for shielded execution architectures, where sensitive code is executed— in the realm of a potential attacker—inside hardware enclaves. In such a setting, an untrusted operating system can conduct noiseless controlled-channel attacks by exploiting page access patterns. In this work, we identify a critical vulnerability in the RSA key generation procedure of Intel SGX SSL (and the underlying OpenSSL library) that allows to recover secret keys from observations of a single execution. In particular, we mount a controlled-channel attack on the binary Euclidean algorithm (BEA), which is used for checking the validity of the RSA key parameters generated within an SGX enclave. Thereby, we recover all but 16 bits of one of the two prime factors of the public modulus. For an 8 192 -bit RSA modulus, we recover the remaining 16 bits and thus the full key in less than 12 seconds on a commodity PC. In light of these results, we urge for careful re-evaluation of cryptographic libraries with respect to single trace attacks, especially if they are intended for shielded execution environments such as Intel SGX.